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1958] RECENT DECISIONS 289 
INSURANCE-FEDERAL REGULATION-AUTHORITY OF FEDERAL TRADE COM-
MISSION To REGULATE FALSE ADVERTISING BY INSURANCE COMPANIES AS AF-
FECTED BY THE McCARRAN-FERGUSON Aar-Petitioner, the FTC, issued 
cease and desist orders1 prohibiting respondent health and accident in-
surance companies, doing business in interstate commerce, from disseminat-
ing allegedly false and deceptive advertising through the medium of local 
agents. These orders, issued pursuant to the FTC act,2 sought to proscribe 
such activity both in states that had statutes prohibiting unfair and de-
ceptive practices and in states that did not. The Courts of Appeals for the 
Fifth3 and Sixth4 Circuits concluded that the FTC had no authority to 
regulate such advertising in states which had prohibitory legislation. On 
certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, held, affirmed per curiam. 
The state insurance legislation in this case precludes regulation by the 
FTC because of the provision in the McCarran-Ferguson Act of 1945 which 
allows FTC regulation of insurance only "to the extent that such business 
is not regulated by State law .... "5 Federal Trade Commission v. National 
Casualty Co., 357 U.S. 560 (1958). 
Following the Supreme Court decision in United States v. South-Eastern 
Underwriters Association,6 which upheld federal regulation of the in-
surance business on the ground that insurance was "commerce" within 
the meaning of the commerce clause of the Constitution, Congress en-
acted the McCarran-Ferguson Act.7 It was the intent of Congress, by pas-
sage of this statute, to consent to continued regulation and taxation of 
the insurance business by the states.8 In asserting its authority also to 
1 For background on the issuance of these orders, see McAlevey, "Present Status of 
State Regulation of the Accident and Health Business," 1956 INS. L. J. 39; Fraizer, "Fed-
eral Trade Commission Jurisdiction?" 22 lNs. COUNSEL J. 467 (1955). 
2 38 Stat. 717 (1914), 15 U.S.C. (1952) §§41-51. 
3 American Hospital and Life Ins. Co. v. FTC, (5th Cir. 1957) 243 F. (2d) 719. 
4 National Casualty Co. v. FTC, (6th Cir. 1957) 245 F. (2d) 883. 
5 59 Stat. 33 (1945), as amended, 15 U.S.C. (1952) §§1011-1015. The pertinent provisions 
of the act are as follows: 
" ••.. [I]he Congress hereby declares that the continued regulation and taxation 
by the several States of the business of insurance is in the public interest, and that 
silence on the part of the Congress shall not be construed to impose any barrier to the 
regulation or taxation of such business by the several States. 
"Sec. 2 (a) The business of insurance, and every person engaged therein, shall be 
subject to the laws of the several States which relate to the regulation or taxation of such 
business. 
"(b) No Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede any 
law enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance, ••• 
unless such Act specifically relates to the business of insurance: Provided, That after 
June 30, 1948, .•• the Federal Trade Commission Act ••. shall be applicable to the 
busine.1s of insurance to the extent that such business is not regulated by State law .••• " 
6 ~22 U.S. 533 (1944). 
7 Note 5 supra. 
s The constitutionality of such consent was upheld in Prudential Insurance Co. v. 
Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408 (1946), where the Supreme Court held that the intent of Congress 
was to sustain state legislation pursuant to this act "from any attack under the com-
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regulate, the FTC in the principal case raised two interpretative questions 
under the McCarran Act. The first of these was whether Congress had 
intended to foreclose federal regulation of interstate insurance as a sup-
plement to state action in light of the territorial limitations on state power 
to regulate an interstate business. The Supreme Court effectively by-passed 
this question, however, by resting its decision on the fact that state regula-
tion was here permitted because respondents' advertising programs re-
quired distribution by local agents. Although jurisdictional limitations on 
effective regulation of interstate insurance activities are at present a severe 
barrier to adequate state control,9 some states have enacted reciprocal 
regulatory legislation in an effort to overcome these problems.10 At least 
one state legislature has even sought to supplement its unfair insurance 
practices legislation through an act designed to regulate false advertising 
by unauthorized foreign insurers.11 If similar statutory schemes are widely 
enacted and withstand constitutional attack, they would seemingly provide 
an effective means of state regulation of interstate insurance practices. 
If this proves to be true, it should greatly influence any subsequent 
merce clause." (Emphasis added.) Id. at 431. Since the Benjamin case, only three Supreme 
Court decisions have construed the McCarran Act: Travelers Health Assn. v. Virginia, 
339 U.S. 643 (1950) (state permitted to order a foreign mail-order health insurer to cease 
and desist from further offerings or sales of certificates of insurance until it complied 
:with the state's blue-sky law by consenting to suit by service of process on the Secretary 
of State); Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 348 U.S. 310 (1955) (in the 
absence of applicable federal admiralty statutes, states allowed to regulate marine insur-
ance); Maryland Cas. Co. v. Cushing, 347 U.S. 409 (1954) (states not granted the power 
to pass valid statutes regulating marine insurance that conflict with federal admiralty 
statutes). Several lower courts have construed the McCarran Act, among them the Court 
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in North Little Rock Transportation Co. v. Casualty 
Reciprocal Exchange, (8th Cir. 1950) 181 F. (2d) 174, cert. den. 340 U.S. 823 (1950) (see 
note 12 infra); and the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in United States v. 
Sylvanus, (7th Cir. 1951) 192 F. (2d) 96, which held that Congress did not intend by the 
McCarran Act to surrender to the states the power to prosecute persons using the mails 
to defraud. 
9 67 YALE L. J. 452 at 460 (1958). 
10 Some states prohibit unauthorized foreign sales by insurers incorporated in the 
state. See, e.g., Ohio Rev. Code Ann. (Page, 1954) §3905.44; Ore. Rev. Stat. (1955) §736.645. 
Other states prohibit only domestic insurance companies from engaging in unauthorized 
foreign sales where the foreign state has enacted reciprocal legislation. See, e.g., Wash. 
Rev. Code (Supp. 1957) §48.07.150. Most states have enacted the Unauthorized Insurers 
Process Act designed to facilitate suits by or on behalf of insureds or beneficiaries under 
contracts with unauthorized foreign insurers by designating the state insurance com-
missioner as the insurer's agent for service of process. See, e.g., Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. 
(1949) §40-2001. See also 67 YALE L. J. 452 (1958). 
11 N.D. Rev. Code (1943; Supp. 1957) c. 26-09 A. This act is entitled the Unauthorized 
Insurers False Advertising Process Act. For a strong argument in support of the constitu-
tionality of this act, see Mccarter, "Recent Misleading and Deceptive Mail-Order Ac-
cident and Health Insurance Policies and Advertising," 1956 INs. L. J. 247 at 256. By 
contrast, the Unauthorized Insurers Process Act, note 10 supra, is not intended to regulate 
but is merely intended to facilitate suits by or on behalf of insureds or beneficiaries 
under contracts with unauthorized foreign insurers. 
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determination by the Supreme Court of whether Congress did intend to 
foreclose all federal regulation of interstate insurance. 
The second interpretative problem raised by the FTC in the principal 
case dealt with the intended meaning of "regulation" as used in the 
McCarran Act. Did Congress mean to equate "regulation" with "legisla-
tion,.. in the sense that mere enactment of regulatory statutes by the 
states would suffice to satisfy this requirement? Or was "regulation" in-
tended to mean actual regulation in fact, either through application of 
the local statutes to individual cases or through establishment of an 
adequate state organization operating in a regulatory capacity? Only 
one prior case has considered this problem.12 Its holding that mere enact-
ment of legislation was the equivalent of "regulation" is inconclusive on 
the question here presented, as there was apparently no argument made 
in that case that legislation alone was not effective regulation. While in 
the instant case the Court recognized that there might be some difference 
in definition between "regulation" and "legislation," it nevertheless held 
that, at least where no argument was made that the legislation was mere 
pretense, the legislation here involved satisfied the "regulation,. require-
ment of the McCarran Act.18 Although congressional intent as to the 
possible distinction between legislation and regulation is not readily 
discernible, it seems clear that some difference was intended.14 The 
equation made by the Supreme Court could prove unfortunate for ad-
vocates of state regulation, as consumer pressures may dictate congres-
sional intervention if state legislation does not prove to be effectively 
enforced. On the other hand, the threat of possible FTC jurisdiction 
could itself induce effective state enforcement of its regulatory legislation. 
Charles C. Moore, S.Ed. 
12 North Little Rocle Transportation Co. v. Casualty Reciprocal Exchange. note 8 
supra. The court upheld a summary judgment of dismissal of a policyholder's action 
for treble damages under the Sherman Act. The fact that the State of Arkansas had 
enacted rate regulatory legislation under the McCarran Act insulated the company from 
civil liability under the Sherman Act. 
18 Legislation identical with or substantially similar to this act has been enacted 
in nearly every state. For citations to state statutes, see 67 YALE L. J. 452 at 465, n. 54 
(1958). 
14 Kimball and Boyce, "The Adequacy of State Insurance Rate Regulation: The 
McCarran-Ferguson Act in Historical Perspective," 56 M1cH. L. REv. 545 at 566-576 (1958). 
Although regulatory machinery in many states has been enacted, it is not yet adequately 
enforced. 67 YALE L. J. 452 at 459 (1958), 
